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THE ROAD TO WATERGATE AND BEYOND:
THE GROWTH AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY SINCE 1940
BARTON J. BERNSTEIN*
You've got to protect the President from the dirty stuff. There's got to be
a break. The President can't survive [if he is tied to this sort of activity-illegal
mail openings]. But somebody's got to take the heat. So let old Helms take it,
and I'm taking it.
Richard Helms, Oct. 21, 19751
[T]he power of the President was viewed by some in the [Nixon] White
House as almost without limit; especially when national or internal security
was invoked, even criminal laws were considered subordinate to Presidential
decision or strategy.
Ervin Committee Final Report, 19742
INTRODUCTION
The investigation of Watergate, as well as other inquiries, revealed a host
of presidential illegalities: break-ins, buggings, violations of privacy, cover-ups,
abuse of the national security machinery (Justice Department, FBI, CIA,
NSA) and related agencies (especially the Internal Revenue Service). In the
aftermath of Watergate, many Americans have asked, "How could President
Nixon have been so wrong as to believe that he could get away with it-the
break-in, bugging, and cover-up?" This question overlooks two fundamental
points: first, that he did almost get away with "it"; and second, that he had
reason to believe that he would succeed because his actions were, in important
ways, similar to earlier executive misuse of power, especially in the area of
internal security, often involving the FBI. 3
According to this thesis, Watergate was a culmination of the growth 4 and
* Associate Professor of History, Stanford University.
1. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 23, 1975, at 13, col. 6.
2. SENATE SELECT-COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAM1PAIGN ACTIVITIES, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL
REPORT 3 (1974).
3. This paper assumes that some of the significant trends can be traced back well before
Franklin Roosevelt's administration, but that seems to be the important seedbed for the present,
partly because the claims of crisis and of national security maintained salience throughout the
years since 1940. See, e.g., two other papers in this symposium: Patterson, The Rise of Presidential
Power Before World War 11, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 39 (1976); Sofaer, The Presidencv,
War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 12
(1976).
4. This analysis does not rest on the answer to a related question: whether the Nixon
administration's actions, in their entirety, expressed a svstenatic disregard for law while other ad-
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abuse of presidential and executive power since 1940 in both domestic and
foreign affairs, including the many deceits of World War II and the Cold
War, the lies of the Vietnam War, and the "dirty tricks" of the CIA. The
results have been a corruption of the polity, an erosion of congressional au-
thority, a systematic use of deceit and manipulation, and a subversion of law
and the Constitution. Much of this has been justified by the dangerously elas-
tic rationale of "national security"-of a nation imperiled by a menace (first
fascism, then communism) at home and abroad.
I
WATERGATE: THE UNEXPECTED UNRAVELLING OF A CONSPIRACY
What was Watergate? A "third-rate burglary '5 accidentally discovered and
a cover-up that slowly unravelled. Why should Americans marvel at Nixon's
belief that he could get away with it? He almost did, as I have just observed, and
other administrations, as well as national security agencies, have gotten away
with similar, perhaps even worse, acts.'
Nixon was not irrational or unreasonable-only as it happened, wrong-in
believing that he could halt the inquiry into Watergate well before it reached
the oval office. It took an unpredictable set of circumstances-a maverick
judge, John Sirica, and enterprising reporters of a daring anti-Nixon news-
paper,7 the Washington Post, to trace the crime to the White House and bring
down the President.
Remember that in 1972, few responsible Americans, especially the press
pundits and academic analysts, thought that Watergate was much more than a
minor break-in. Few listened seriously to George McGovern's agonizing cries,
in the last days of his woeful campaign, when he charged the GOP with these
ministrations expressed only an episodic disregard for law. Such a comforting distinction between
"systematic" and "episodic" assumes that we know as much about earlier administrations as we do
about Nixon's in these areas. We do not. Without the inquiry into Watergate, there would have
been few investigations of Nixon's administration, and probably they would have disclosed very
little. In the past half century, no other administration has been subjected to such intensive inves-
tigative scrutiny as Nixon's, and many of the ugly disclosures about Franklin D. Roosevelt and his
successors have emerged years after the events, as a result of investigations of Nixon. Some
critical sources (e.g., J. Edgar Hoover's special files) have been destroyed, and many other materi-
als, especially at presidential libraries, are still closed to scholars, so there are substantial barriers
at the present to those who want to examine in great depth illegal behavior by administrations in
the years after 1940.
5. White House statement, in SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
supra note 2, at 2.
6. Critics have correctly pointed out that the Watergate break-in and bugging were anomalous
in at least one important respect: The Committee for the Re-Election of the President hired its
own "army" and did not depend on the FBI. Why? Perhaps the FBI was not judged reliable, and
there may have been fear that the agency could use the information against CRP and the Nixon
administration.
7. Conversations between William Graham and the author (1969-1970).
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"dirty tricks." So great was the will of most Americans to believe in the sanc-
tity of the national election, so great was their faith in the Presidency and in
the national leadership of the two parties, that few outside the McGovern
camp found the charges plausible. McGovern did not understand America, as
one prominent historian explained, for he was addicted to European themes
of conspiracy. McGovern's charges were the product of the same dangerous
mentality, a noted legal scholar decreed, that lacked faith in the Warren
Commission report and mistrusted the CIA.'
American citizens, whether lay people or scholars, even when criticizing
particular administration policies, preferred to believe in the morality of high
office holders, and the press has helped maintain this faith. The established
press had long been reluctant to publish information that might challenge the
legitimacy of the American system or its leaders. By its definition of respon-
sibility, the press had often excluded disruptive themes, disregarded or
minimized troubling events, and failed to investigate unsettling charges.
Natural caution, fear of offending the powerful, anxiety about seeming ir-
responsible-all these reinforced the national media's desire to serve as a bul-
wark of legitimacy and stability.
The painful events of the sixties threatened this legitimacy and stability.
The war, the demonstrations and police confrontations, the race riots and
burnings, and the assassinations had a two-pronged, paradoxical effect: they
broadened the dialogue and encouraged investigatory reportage, yet also con-
strained many analysts in the mainstream. There was a deep fear that the
social fabric was being torn apart amid the talk of revolution, the cries of
genocide and imperialism, and the accusations of racism. With the fear of
disorder, the major press would have had no enthusiasm-not even will-
ingness-to trace a Watergate break-in to the White House had it happened
in, say, 1968 or 1970. The nation, many responsible citizens believed, could
not have endured under the added burden of such disclosures.
Ironically, it was Richard Nixon's misfortune that the Watergate break-in
coincided with the relaxation of social tensions. By 1972, few Americans still
feared that their society might come apart, for the various radical movements,
both black and white, were themselves in disarray, and the end of the war
seemed near.
More than restoration of confidence was needed, however, to bring down
the President-it took an unusual judge and a crusading newspaper. Had
John Sirica, whose career had not been marked by dignity or decorum, not
assiduously pursued the Watergate matter, he might have simply sentenced
Liddy, Hunt, McCord, and the others to brief terms. It would have remained
8. These statements are from personal conversations, and there is no need to embarrass the
sources by identifying them by name.
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a "third-rate burglary," little more. But Sirica pressed beyond, found the weak
link (McCord), broke the chain of silence, and squeezed out more information
than probably even he anticipated.
Perhaps equally critical were the efforts, starting earlier, of Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward, two investigative reporters, who worked for a paper and
publisher eager to uncover Nixon's wrongdoings. Their investigation was not
a vendetta, but there was untrammeled enthusiasm at the Post. Lacking were
the normal impediments and restraints-loyalty to high office or personal af-
fection for the President. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson could,
and perhaps did, count on such deterrents to block inquiries into sticky mat-
ters, and they were protected. Nixon, instead, had earned the hatred of the
publisher, which freed Bernstein and Woodward to follow their tips all the
way to the White House.9 The Washington Post's bold crusade required the
financial strength and prestige that only a few major papers possessed, and
the others, including the New York Times,"' had not been prepared to embark
on such a risky course. Without the Post, we may conclude, the Watergate
investigation might have ended safely for Nixon-far from the oval office.
II
THE GROWTH AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER:
THE EROSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AT HOME
The growth of concern about "national security," both at home and
abroad, has made it easy for presidents and their associates, whether aides or
cabinet members, to seek political intelligence from federal intelligence agen-
cies (especially the FBI) for partisan or personal purposes, to link these self-
serving goals with national security, and to allow these agencies to expand
their authority and influence, even to move into illegal and dubious activities.
The result, most notably in the case of the FBI (about which we now know
the most), is that the agency was often restrained by neither the Executive nor
Congress, that it was usually willing to do the political bidding of the Execu-
tive, that it occasionally curried favor with some congressmen by leaking se-
crets to them, and that it was often able to determine its own rules and prac-
tices. "The FBI intelligence system developed to a point," concluded the staff
of the Church Committee, "where no one inside or outside the Bureau was
willing or able to tell the difference between legitimate national security or
law enforcement information and purely political intelligence."'"
9. C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
10. The skimpy public evidence does not reveal why the New York Times did not pursue the
Watergate case with the same ardor. Perhaps the earlier battle over the Pentagon Papers left the
paper reluctant.
II. STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
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The record of political abuses involving the FBI did not begin with
Richard Nixon. Well before he entered the White House, other administra-
tions, starting with Franklin Roosevelt's, had been directing the Bureau to
serve their partisan and personal needs; the agency had done so, often ea-
gerly, sometimes even proffering unsolicited information. This relationship
with the Executive, despite many variations in tone and detail, enabled the
FBI to expand its power and to gain independence of administration over-
sight. It outmaneuvered Attorneys General, who came and went, while J.
Edgar Hoover, its shrewd director, flourished amid the acclaim that he
helped generate for self and agency. He skillfully defended himself and his
agency (which came to seem identical) within both the executive branch and
the Congress. With the help of both, as well as of the media with whom he
ably curried favor, Hoover created and polished the familiar image of the
FBI as being beyond the reach of politicians-an independent, trusted guard-
ian of the nation, beholden only to justice.' 2
That image, as critics on the Left have long charged, a" had little relation-
ship to reality. But, aside from the FBI's wretched record in civil rights for
racial minorities, an issue that surfaced in the sixties, the agency was generally
exempt from much public or scholarly criticism until recently. Despite occa-
sional disclosures of overzealous investigation or intended repression of the
Left or extreme Right, most citizens were untroubled. 4 Marginal, dissident
movements and organizations, well outside the two-party system, have seldom
been able to expect much protection under the law. Most Americans happily
endorse such a political double standard, and the Executive has seldom been
troubled by political repression and illegal acts directed against groups outside
the mainstream of politics: the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party,
sections of the New Left, and the Ku Klux Klan.
This growth of FBI powers both expanded and contracted presidential
power. This is not a paradox. The Chief Executive and the Attorney General
lost some power over the agency, but its actions often gave these officials
more power over the society. Beginning in the Roosevelt years, J. Edgar
Hoover began eroding presidential and executive control of the FBI; he
carved out areas of virtual autonomy. Despite their legal authority, Presidents
and Attorneys General acceded, acquiesced, or even allowed FBI illegalities
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON POLITICAL ABUSE AND THE FBI
(Comm. Print 1975); cf. Theoharis, The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936-1953, 91 POL.
Sci. Q. 649 (1976).
12. 6 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intel-
ligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Intelligence Activities Hear-
ings]; F. COOK, THE FBI NOBODY KNOWS 167-203 (1964).
13. F. CooK, supra note 12; Levine, Hoover and the Red Scare, 145 NATION, Oct. 20, 1962, at
232.
14. A. WOLFE, THE SEAMY SIDE OF DEMOCRACY: REPRESSION IN AMERICA 33-124 (1973);
Memorandum from the FBI (Jan. 12, 1976), in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 992-95.
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and improprieties. Officials were unwilling to do battle with Hoover. The cost
could be too great. The likelihood of defeat was high, the value of victory
marginal. Often top officials acted as if they preferred not to know when the
FBI violated or stretched the law. These agency actions sometimes served the
President's purposes, by giving him and the Attorney General more power
over sectors of the society-through using political intelligence, blocking dis-
sent, and thwarting dissident movements.
A. The Roosevelt Administration
The record of political abuses begins with President Franklin Roosevelt,
during whose administration the FBI also began to develop its lustrous repu-
tation. Roosevelt, apparently misusing presidential authority and violating the
law, ordered the FBI to wiretap various associates, including Tommy ("the
Cork") Corcoran and Harry Hopkins, whose wife, the President suspected,
was passing politically damaging material to the anti-New Deal press. The
Bureau, as the President anticipated, became a willing ally in political espio-
nage and in dirty bureaucratic politics.'
5
Roosevelt also used the FBI to gather information on self-admitted critics
of his foreign policy-especially those who wrote letters to the White House
criticizing him for interventionism. His secretary sent the letters to J. Edgar
Hoover with the gentle suggestion, "The President thought you might like to
look them over, noting the names and addresses of the senders."' 6 Hoover
gave the White House information on those people already in Bureau files
and opened files on others. "You have done and are doing a wonderful job,"
Roosevelt wrote Hoover, expressing "gratitude and appreciation." 7
The President also greatly expanded FBI powers to conduct electronic
surveillance. Even though recent Supreme Court interpretations seemed to
bar the federal government from using wiretaps to gather information,
Roosevelt boldly authorized their use for national security purposes. On May
21, 1940, he sent a confidential directive to Attorney General Robert
Jackson: '5
15. REPORT ON POLITICAL ABUSE AND THE FBI, sipia note 11, at 2-3: N.Y. Times. July 19,
1973, at 20, col. 7.
16. Letter from Stephen Earl', toJ. Edgar Hoover (May 21, 1940) (on file in Official File 10B,
box 14, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park) [hereinafter cited as FDR Library OF]. See aLso
Letters from Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover (May 18 & 29, 1940); Letter from F.D. Roosevelt
to Stephen Earl, (May 21, 1940); Letter from Rudolph Forster to J. Edgar Hoover (May 23,
1940) (on file in FDR Librar OF 10B). See also President's Personal File 200B: Message to Con-
gress (Ma' 16, 1940) (on file in FDR Library).
17. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover (June 14. 1940); Letter from
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Edwin Watson (June 12, 1940): Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Stephen
Earlx' (Aug. 20, 1940), (on file in FDR Library OF 10B).
18. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert Jackson (May 21, 1940) (on file with Stephen
Spingarn Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence) (emphasis added).
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[T]he Supreme Court . . . is also right in its opinion that under ordinary
and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents should not be
carried out for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of
civil rights. It is, of course, well known that certain other nations have been
engaged in the organization of propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns' in
other countries and in preparation for sabotage, as well as actual sabotage. It
is too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassinations, and 'fifth
column' activities are completed. You are, therefore, authorized and directed
in such cases as you approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to
authorize the necessary investigating agents that they are at liberty to secure
information by listening devices direct to the conversations or other com-
munications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government
of the United States, including suspected spies. You are requested further-
more to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit
them in so far as possible to aliens.
Moving into a gray area of law, Roosevelt seized the initiative and let the
Justice Department use wiretaps until the Supreme Court or Congress ex-
plicitly barred the practice. And amid the fears of Germany and Russia, there
was little likelihood that, when the courts or Congress learned of this order,
they would speedily, if at all, reverse the President.19
Roosevelt's memorandum was loosely drawn. Attorney General Jackson
did not like it, presumably, as Francis Biddle, his successor, explained, be-
cause "it opened the door pretty wide to wiretapping of anyone suspected of
subversive activities." As a result, according to Biddle, Jackson did not pass on
each case, as the directive seemed to require, but let J. Edgar Hoover make
the decisions." Hoover, armed with this loosely drawn order, could easily
stretch it to go well beyond what Roosevelt probably had intended.
Francis Biddle, when succeeding Jackson, reasserted oversight by the At-
torney General. "I studied the applications carefully," wrote Biddle later,
"sometimes requesting more information, occasionally turning them down
when I thought they were not warranted. Most of the taps were," he ex-
plained, "on Communists, and on suspected spies in the German and Russian
embassies and consulates, particularly after [Pearl Harbor]."2
How successful were Jackson and Biddle in restraining the FBI and other
federal agencies in conducting wiretaps? What standards were used? Too
many records are closed and possibly destroyed to allow precise answers, but
there is enough information to permit us profitably to address these ques-
tions. Biddle, himself, has spoken obliquely on the subject. "The current gos-
sip in Washington was," he later wrote, "that many of the government agen-
19. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321
(1939); S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 386-102 (1959); Navasky & Lewin, Electronic Surmeillance, in
P. WATTERS & S. GILLERS, INVESTIGATING THE FBI 316-21 (1973); Theoharis & Meyer, The 'Na-
tional Securit"Justification for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 749,
756-59 (1968).
20. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 167 (1962).
21. Id.
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cies were currently engaged in this kind of detective surveillance. 2 2 There is
no evidence that he moved to investigate the rumors or wanted to chide the
agencies. Perhaps he did not want to know or to act. He understood that in
wartime, the rationale of "national defense," later to be translated into "na-
tional security," could politically justify most intrusions upon privacy, and
even violations of law. We know, for example, that Army intelligence, what-
ever its basis for authority, tapped the phones of Eleanor Roosevelt 23 and of
many physicists in the Manhattan Project. 4
J. Edgar Hoover, as the head of a powerful police system, knew how to
please his nominal superiors-Roosevelt and Biddle-and thereby protect
his organization from close scrutiny, even from unpleasant questions. The
Bureau performed various favors for the President-often of a political na-
ture. Hoover also charmed and flattered Biddle by sharing with him what the
Attorney General described as "his extraordinarily broad knowledge of the
intimate details of what my associates in the Cabinet did and said . . . their
weaknesses and their associations." These often revealing bits of information,
gathered by the FBI, delighted the Attorney General, who seemed generally
untroubled by the invasions of privacy. He believed that he would never use
this information for mean or even ungentlemanly purposes, and so the dis-
closures did not bother him. His relationship with Hoover, according to Bid-
dIe, was cozy-of modest indiscretion, of some trust.
2 5
B. The Truman Administration
Under President Harry S. Truman, Hoover's coziness with Attorneys Gen-
eral continued; indeed, since they lacked the civil libertarian bent of Biddle,
the relationships may even have been closer.2" They helped expand the size
and authority of the FBI, especially in the area of "national security," as it
came to be called in the Cold War. Hoover's relations with Truman himself
may have been more strained than were those with Roosevelt, but it does not
appear that Truman's suspicions of Hoover had much effect on the growth or
power of the agency, its ability to violate the law, or its comfortable relation-
ships with the Attorneys General.
Major General Harry Vaughan, Truman's former military aide and crony,
recently claimed that the new President cut off electronic surveillance
(as initiated by Roosevelt) on members of the administration. According to
Vaughan, when Truman first received a transcript of the FBI tap on
22. Id. at 167-68.
23. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1965, at 1, col. 3.
24. Memoranda from Leslie Groves (Feb. 3, 1943: Apr. 28, 1945) (on file in Groves Papers,
Record Group 200, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
25. F. BIDDLE, supra note 20, at 258, 259, 167-69.
26. A. THEOHARIS, SEEDS OF REPRESSION: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF MC-
CARTHYISM 123-46 (1971).
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Corcoran's phone and read of Mrs. Corcoran's dealings with her hairdresser,
the President pungently declared, "I don't have time for this foolishness," and
ended the taps. 27
Truman already mistrusted Hoover and the FBI. In May 1945, for exam-
ple, the President confided to his budget director, Harold Smith, that he dis-
approved of some of the Bureau's activities. Smith dryly added, "It was not
altogether appropriate [for the FBI to collect materials] on the sex lives of
Washington bureaucrats and members of Congress." "The President seemed,"
recorded Smith, "to agree heartily." They both realized that Hoover could use
his information for political blackmail and intimidation, at a minimum to
advance the interests of the Bureau. They were reluctant to grant it a build-
ing separate from the Justice Department, lest the agency become more
independent.2 8 Truman later admitted that he was worried that the FBI
might become an American "gestapo."2 9
Hoover eagerly offered the politically useful fruits of wiretapping and
surveillance to at least some members of the cabinet. In May 1946, for exam-
ple, he sent Secretary of State James F. Byrnes a partial transcript of a phone
conversation by J. Robert Oppenheimer, the nuclear physicist who was ad-
vising the State Department on international control of atomic energy. The
conversation did not mention scientific matters but was bureaucratically indis-
creet, for Oppenheimer expressed doubts about both a United States adminis-
trator (Bernard Baruch) and his plan."'
Secretary Byrnes, although a former Supreme Court Justice, did not re-
buke Hoover for stepping over the line into political espionage. Presumably
Byrnes expected to receive more information in the future. Hoover did send
him other reports, possibly based on wiretaps, that alerted the Secretary to
forthcoming public attacks on his foreign policy by leftist groups.3 '
There is no firm evidence that the President himself ever ordered
wiretaps or surveillance of his adversaries within the two-party system. His
aides were less restrained, and probably they believed that he approved of
their efforts. In 1946, for example, after Harold Ickes blasted and blocked a
Truman nominee to the cabinet, a Truman aide ordered a FBI investigation
of Ickes to dig up political dirt.32 Later, another aide planned to have the
FBI, and possibly the CIA, investigate another administration critic, Henry
Wallace, the former Secretary of Commerce, but backed away upon conclud-
27. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1973, at 20, col. 7.
28. Harold Smith Diary (May 11, 1945) (on file in Truman Library).
29. Id. (Dec. 11, 1945).
30. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to James F. Byrnes (May 23, 1946) (on file in Byrnes Papers,
Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University).
31. Id. (May 28, 1945).
32. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Vaughan (Dec. 6, 1946) (on file in "FBI" folder,
President's Secretary's File, Truman Library) [hereinafter cited as "FBI" folder, PSF].
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ing that the news might leak out and embarrass the administration. 33 The
Bureau, probably at the request of Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall,
apparently also tapped the phone of at least one columnist (Drew Pearson) to
trace information leaks, primarily regarding bureaucratic disputes. At one
point, Truman apparently also targeted Pearson as an "enemy" for an Inter-
nal Revenue Service audit.
34
Throughout Truman's years in office, Hoover kept sending him reports
on Communist and leftwing groups, on civil rights organizations 3 5 and some-
times on individuals (including Senator Joseph McCarthy)3 6 or groups where
the FBI had information that might be politically useful to the administration.
There was no mention of wiretaps or bugs; usually the sources were described
as "highly confidential," "highly reliable," or "confidential [and] believed to be
reliable."3 7 Such reports were filed in the President's secretary's files, a collec-
tion of highly valued documents in the President's outer office.
In 1947, for example, Corcoran was again the subject of a Hoover special
message, this time that the former New Dealer was supporting Senator Robert
LaFollette as chairman of the AEC and Bernard Baruch as Ambassador to
Britain. 38 Other political intelligence also flowed into the White House:
Newspapers were planning a series on organized crime and politicians that
would be critical of the administration; 39 a scandal would soon break and "be
very embarrassing to the Democratic Administration"; 4 a labor union had
defined its secret negotiating position; 41 and Newsweek had obtained a story on
foreign policy from the State Department. 42 The intent of all these reports
was to help prepare the administration and to help it guard against political
embarrassment.
Many of the reports on leftist groups had the same function. It was hardly
a subversive matter that Communists were influential in formulating a
33. Letter from George M. Elsey to Clark Clifford (Aug. 25, 1948) (on file in General
File-1948), Elsey Papers, Truman Library).
34. D. PEARSON, DIARIES, 1949-1959, at 167-68, 190-91 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Vaughan (Jan. 11 & 17, 1946; May 29,
1946); Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to George Allen (Sept. 25 & Dec. 13, 1946) (on file in "FBI"
folder, PSF).
36. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Sidney Souers (Feb. 20, 1951) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
37. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach later testified that "highly reliable" was, at least
during his tenure, a euphemism for a "bug." 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 202.
38. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Vaughan (Feb. 15, 1947) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
39. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Matthew Connelly (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file in "FBI"
folder, PSF).
40. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George Allen (Dec. 13, 1946) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
41. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Vaughan (June 25, 1947) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
42. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Tom Clark (Apr. 1, 1946) (on file in
"FBI" folder, PSF).
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NAACP chapter's resolution on lynching; that a Negro rights organization
was going to ask for a White House appointment; 43 that some left-wing
groups were going to send telegrams protesting foreign policy; 44 or that
another group was going to condemn the actions of the FBI and the Justice
Department.4 5
Whatever Truman's personal doubts about the FBI, he never tried to halt
this flow of political espionage. He never rebuked Hoover, never refused the
messages, and apparently never considered them improper. Undoubtedly
they were sometimes politically useful to the President, and he neither wanted
to cut off the supply nor risk offending Hoover.
In 1946, upon the request of Attorney General Tom Clark, who was fear-
ful of the communist threat at home, Truman reaffirmed Roosevelt's execu-
tive order of 1940 and expanded it to include cases "vitally affecting the
domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy."4 6 The new directive
allowed wiretapping in a large, ill-defined range of suspect political ac-
tivities.
47
Truman probably did not realize that the new order might significantly
expand the range of authorized federal wiretapping. How much the new
categories broadened the actual FBI practices cannot be determined, for most
records on both the Roosevelt and Truman years remain closed or have been
destroyed. Under the new order, Edward Condon, Director of the Bureau of
Standards, among others, was wiretapped; but in view of the wartime wiretaps
that Roosevelt ordered on Corcoran and Hopkins, we cannot be sure that the
new order expanded the practice. Probably it did, for criteria tinder Attor-
neys General Clark and J. Howard McGrath, both of whom had little concern
about civil liberties, were probably more elastic than under Biddle.48
43. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George Allen (Sept. 25, 1946) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
44. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Vaughan (Jan. 17. 1946) (on file in "FBI" folder,
PSF).
45. Letter from J. Howard McGrath to Harry Truman (Dec. 7, 1949) (on file in "Attorney
General" folder, PSF).
46. Letter from Tom Clark to Harry Truman (July 17, 1946) (on file in Stephen Spingarn
Papers, Truman Library With "1 concur" written by Truman at bottom. Truman dated his note
July 17, 1947, but that dating seems to be an error, for 1946 is probably the correct date.
47. Letter from George M. Elsev to Harrv Truman (Feb. 2, 1950) (on file in Spingarn Papers,
Truman Library). Elsey called attention to the fact that Clark's 1946 order greatly expanded the
purview of the 1940 order. In particular, two parts of the 1940 order were omitted in the 1946
order: "[U]nder ordinary and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents should
not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights";
and "[y]ou are requested furthermore to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum
and to limit them insofar as possible to aliens." Attorney General McGrath denied that the 1946
order had broadened the categories beyond those of 1940, When he stated that there was no new
policy or procedure since Roosevelt. Department of Justice Press Release (Jan. 9, 1950) (on file in
Department of Justice Library).
48. For a discussion of the 1946 and 1940 orders, see Theoharis, Document: Attorney General
Tom Clark, Internal Security, and the Truman Administration, 6 NEW U. THOUGHir no. 3, at 16 (1968).
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In 1949, the Coplon case revealed that the FBI had kept various liberal
citizens under surveillance and had a wide net of wiretaps.49 Partly on the
basis of Bureau sources (probably taps or bugs), Attorney General McGrath
was able to warn Truman that a group would soon issue a report attacking
the administration for "certain alleged practices of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and will recommend that you [order it] to cease wire tapping, mail
opening, and illegal searches in which, according to the report, the Bureau
engages." The Attorney General went on in his letter to defend Hoover and
the FBI. McGrath reminded Truman that Roosevelt had authorized the At-
torney General to allow the tapping of persons suspected of subversive ac-
tivities, and McGrath implied that the FBI acted, in each case, only with the
express approval of the Attorney General and "only in cases involving espio-
nage, sabotage, grave risks to the internal security of the nation, or [where]
human lives are in jeopardy." McGrath stated that there were "few cases" in
these categories, that he and his predecessors had always exercised strict con-
trol of the FBI, and that the Bureau adhered to these rules5"-dubious claims
that were reiterated on other occasions.
5 1
There is no record of any reply by Truman to McGrath's disingenuous
message. After receiving the Corcoran wiretaps and other FBI reports, the
President had good reason to conclude that Bureau taps reached well beyond
the categories specified by McGrath. Truman also knew that he was receiving
FBI information, often of the type gained from wiretaps, that could be useful
for partisan purposes. The FBI, in short, was helping the administration with
political espionage.
The FBI had also illegally broken into various places, in what are called
"black bag" jobs. In 1945, for example, their break-ins led to some arrests,
but the Justice Department backed away from some prosecutions for fear
that the illegal entries might be disclosed.5 1 Since at least 1942, the FBI
had been doing "black bag" jobs against dissident organizations, 5  and this
practice continued after McGrath's ambivalent order in 1952 that the FBI
not break in to plant bugs. 54 The FBI had also been illegally opening
49. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1949, at 10, col. 3; id. June 11, 1949, at 6, col. I id. June 12, 1949,
at 1, col. 2; id. Dec. 1, 1949, at 28, col. 3.
50. Leter from J. Howard McGrath to Harry Trruman (Dec. 7, 1949) (on file in "Attorney
General" folder, PSF).
51. Department of Justice Press Release (Jan. 8, 1950). Also see the press release (under
Clark) (March 31, 1949) (on file in Department of Justice Library).
52. See F. CooK, supra note 12, at 277-83: Memorandum from W.C. Sullivan to C.D. DeLoach
(July 19, 1966), in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 357-58.
53. Between 1942 and 1968, the FBI committed more than 230 "black bag" jobs. N.Y. Times.
Sept. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
54. The 1952 order dated February 26, signed by McGrath, is ambivalent, if not contradic-
tory. One paragraph ends: "I cannot authorize the installation of a microphone involving a trespas
under existing law." At first glance, that statement may seem to bar such installation, but actually
it only refuses authorization. A later paragraph, after discussing the problems of defining tres-
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mail,5  though McGrath, in his letter of defense, had avoided this charge and
told Truman, "It has been the long standing practice of investigative agencies
to utilize mail covers. This is entirely authorized by law."15 6 In at least one no-
table case, the FBI was forced to admit that it had continued a wiretap after
arrest and had intercepted privileged communications between the defendant
and her attorneys. An FBI agent perjured himself by denying that he knew
of the taps.5
7
Despite these disclosures, the Justice Department continued to defend5"
the FBI and to deny that wiretapping policy had changed under Truman,
even though the 1946 order, which was not disclosed to the public, had, by
Clark's own admission at the time, enlarged the arena for federal wiretap-
ping. So far as the record reveals, Truman never rebuked his associates for
deceiving the public or for defending the FBI when its illegal activities be-
came known.
C. The Eisenhower Administration
The Eisenhower administration had less concern for civil liberties than did
its predecessor, introduced a more repressive loyalty-security program, and
may have relied more substantially on the FBI for partisan purposes. 59 The
administration made even less effort to restrain Hoover. In 1954, Attorney
General Herbert Brownell lifted McGrath's ambivalent order barring some
illegal trespass, and issued a new ruling that seemed to approve most trespass
to plant bugs. "For the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function,"
Brownell informed Hoover (in words used earlier by McGrath), "considera-
tions of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, there-
fore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique [of bugging with
trespass] in the national interest." The bugs should be used, he asserted, with
pass, states: "The Department ... will review the circumstances in each case in the light of the
practical necessities of investigation and of the national interest [and] should adopt that interpre-
tation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our
national interest." Joint Hearings on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-1974 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974).
55. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 2, 1975, at 10, cols. 1-2: 4 Intelligence Activities Hearings 148.
56. Letter from J. Howard McGrath to Harry Truman (Dec. 7, 1949) (on file in Truman
Library).
57. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1950, at 14, col. 3. Just before the trial, some FBI agents had de-
stroyed wiretap evidence records. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1950, at 24, col. 2. According to Matthew
Connelly, at the September 15, 1950 cabinet meeting, "the President warned Cabinet officers that
he is opposed to wire tapping and asked [the] Cabinet to watch this activity carefully." Matthew
Connelly, Cabinet Meeting (Sept. 15, 1950) (on file in the Connelly Papers, Truman Library).
58. Department of Justice Press Release (March 31, 1949; Jan. 8, 1950) (on file in Department
of Justice Library).
59. 2 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENI OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE AcriVITIES, INTELLIGENCE AcTrIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No.
94-775, 94th ConE.. 2d Sess. 237-38 (1976).
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"discretion and intelligent restraint.""' The evidence suggests that Hoover did
not submit requests in each case, and the "national security" rationale proba-
bly allowed him, within broad limits, to do what he wished. 6 1
Hoover, who earlier had leaked some FBI materials to friendly congress-
men, also assisted the Eisenhower administration in its partisan attacks upon
the Truman administration for allegedly harboring Communists. The FBI di-
rector contributed to the "smear" campaign that Truman had allowed Harry
Dexter White (allegedly a known Communist) to stay in the administration
and rise to high position.62 To assist the Eisenhower administration in its ef-
fort to prove that Oppenheimer was a security risk, the FBI bugged his
attorney's office and gave the AEC privileged conversations between the sci-
entist and his lawyer.
63
D. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
Under Kennedy and Johnson, the FBI served the administrations, pro-
vided some useful political intelligence, harassed Martin Luther King, and was
allowed, perhaps without the explicit knowledge of the President or the At-
torney General,64 to continue the "black bag" jobs, and to expand its program
for disrupting left-wing political groups. Initially conceived in the Eisenhower
years to injure the Communist Party, this disruption program, called COIN-
TELPRO (counterintelligence program), went well beyond intelligence gath-
ering to include forgery, impersonation, agents provacateurs, and other
illegalities.
6 5
To trace news leaks from the Department of Justice, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, perhaps without knowing of the precedents under Roosevelt
and Truman, authorized the FBI to wiretap some journalists, including re-
porters for the New York Times and Newsweek. 66 President Kennedy had the
FBI use wiretaps in his battle with the steel industry over price increases in
1962, and he apparently also used-and illegally showed to a journalist-con-
fidential Internal Revenue Service records on some businessmen. 6 7
In both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, with the explicit ap-
proval of Attorneys General Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach, the Bureau
60. Hearings on Warrantless Wiietappig, sopra note 54, at 30.
61. San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 7. 1975, at 8. cols. 3-6.
62. EmIerson. The FBI as a Political Police, in P. WATTERS & S. GILLERS. .supra note 19, at
247-48.
63. L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
64. On claims about knowledge of COINTELPRO, see Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover
to Attorney General Herbert Brownell (May 8, 1958); Memorandum from the FBI to Senate
Select Committee (Jan. 12, 1976), in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 819-30, 992-95, 183, 301.
65. Exhibits 13-21, in id. at 377-407; COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL
FREEDOM 116-13 (C. Perkus ed. 1975).
66. REPORT ON POLITICAl ABUSE AND THE FBI. supra note 11, at 10, 16.
67. B. BRADLEE, CONVERSATIONS WITH KENNEDY 111-12 (1975).
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wiretapped Martin Luther King because, as Robert Kennedy reportedly
claimed, "of the possible Communist influence in the racial situation. '6' As
Katzenbach later testified, the FBI stated that a "secret member of the Com-
munist party . . . might be influencing the actions of Dr. King's movement in
ways amicable to the interests of the Soviet Union and contrary to those of
the United States." The taps were installed ostensibly "for the protection of
Dr. King [because of the influence] of individuals with subversive back-
grounds." 9
We should linger on these justifications: There was no actionable offense,
at most an indiscretion that pained the Government. Even the factual basis
for that concern seems exaggerated, for some FBI agents have recently cast
doubt upon it."'
Probably Kennedy and Katzenbach were trying to protect the civil rights
movement from the taint of communism, which might impair its efficacy.
"Anything which discredited Dr. King, or his non-violent Civil Rights move-
ment, would have been a disaster to the Kennedy adminstration . . . to the
Johnson administration [and] to the country," Katzenbach later explained.7 1
Therefore, they concluded that "protection" for King was necessary. Yet, they
also knew that Hoover had a vendetta against King, that letting the FBI install
a tap on him was like letting Senator Joseph McCarthy tap Dean Acheson.
Authorization of the tap probably also involved a trade-off: There was no way
of stopping Hoover, they knew, so it was better to allow him to do what he
would do anyway, avoid antagonizing him, and thereby protect other ad-
ministration interests.7 2 This explanation, if correct even in rough outline,
signifies that the Attorney General and others in two recent administrations
recognized how little authority they had over Hoover: He could violate the
law at will, and neither the Executive nor Congress would hold him to ac-
count.
Under John F. Kennedy and continuing under Lyndon B. Johnson,
Hoover greatly expanded COINTELPRO, which was aimed at the Socialist
Workers Party, segments of the peace movement, the civil rights movement,
the Black Panthers, other New Left groups, and the Klan.7 3 This strategy of
disruption and harassment, involving, among other crimes, burglary, forgery,
and incitement to violence, was more extreme than what Nixon and his
68. Quoted from a paraphrase by Courtney Evans, in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 168.
Apparently Attorney General Kennedy did not approve electronic surveillance in July 1963 but
authorized it in October.
69. Id. at 209, 168.
70. San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1975, at 14.
71. 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 208. See also Burke Marshall Oral History (Jan. 19-20.
1970) (on file in John F. Kennedy Library).
72. For a similar analysis, see Dershowitz, Before Watergate and After: Unchecked Wiretapping, 172
NEw REPUBLIC, May 31, 1975, at 13.
73. 2 Intelligence Activities Hearings 22-30.
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"plumbers" directed against the Democratic party in 1972. The ill-famed Hus-
ton Plan of the Nixon administration was the logical successor to COINTEL-
PRO and "Operation Hoodwink" (begun in 1966), a program to incite or-
ganized crime to attack the Communist Party.14
Perhaps Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, their Attorneys General, and
other members of the Justice Department did not know of COINTELPRO,
the earlier similar program directed against the Communist Party, or "Opera-
tion Hoodwink." There was also little desire to pry into such matters, to risk
uncovering the unpleasant, or to do combat with Hoover. When occasional
charges against the FBI appeared, they did not provoke the Attorney General
or his assistants to investigate.7 5 The Justice Department tolerated organized
lawlessness, much as Hoover himself had tolerated organized crime. In each
case, there was danger in combat, so it was better not to know.
Johnson and Hoover seem to have developed a cozy, though uneasy, rela-
tionship: two men of power courting, exploiting, and mistrusting each other.
Hoover, following his earlier successful tactics with Roosevelt and Biddle,
happily shared with Johnson juicy morsels about the President's political ad-
versaries and allies.7 6 Johnson requested and secured from the Bureau what
the Church Committee described as "purely political intelligence [about Sen-
ators] obtained as a by-product of otherwise legitimate national security elec-
tronic surveillance of foreign intelligence targets."' 7 The President probably
used some of this information against his opponents on the Hill. 78
There were also other ways in which Hoover served Johnson politically. In
the Bobby Baker case, for example, the FBI refused to help the Criminal
Division of Justice in an investigation on the grounds that security was inade-
quate. Undoubtedly Hoover was reluctant to assist an inquiry that Johnson
opposed and feared, one that might reach to the White House. The Criminal
Division was forced to turn elsewhere (to Treasury's Bureau of Narcotics) for
assistance. 79 When Johnson learned of the aid provided by Narcotics, a presi-
dential assistant ordered the FBI to investigate the head of the Criminal Divi-
sion and the helpful members of Narcotics, especially for associations with
Robert Kennedy, then Johnson's political rival.8""
Johnson was able to use the willing FBI for political espionage, and like
74. 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 77.
75. Id. at 216-17, 241.
76. San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 14, 1975, at 7, cols. 1-4: San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 13,
1975, at I, col. 6.
77. REPORT ON POIATICAL ABUSE AN) T HE FBI, stpra notc 11, at 10.
78. San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 14. 1975, at 7, cols. 1-4.
79. Mernorandum from FBI, Background In formation Concerning Department's Request for
Bodv Recorder in Bobby Baker Investigation in 1965 (Feb. 3, 1975), in 6 Intelligence Activities
Hearings 722-24.
80. Memorandu, m from C.D. DeLoach to Clyde Tolson (Jan. 17, 1967); MerioranduLrm from
M.A. Jones to Mr. Wick (Jan. 19, 1967), in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 728-31.
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some of his predecessors, he comfortably used it to gain information on other
rivals within the two-party system, At his request, at the 1964 Democratic
Convention, for example, the Bureau wiretapped and supplied him with
information on King and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party."
Johnson's lame justification was that he feared a disruption (violence), a
rationale similar to earlier claims by predecessors who had cited national se-
curity or domestic security for personal or partisan benefit.8" Johnson even
went so far as to have the FBI investigate Barry Goldwater's staff in 1964.83
E. Conclusions
The record of these years reveals that some presidents and their attorneys
general used the FBI for political espionage, that all accepted political infor-
mation on adversaries and allies, and all allowed the FBI to operate outside
the law. Often, it appears, presidents and their aides, invoking "national se-
curity," easily justified many of these acts, including break-ins. With the Cold
War, amid the fear of communism and then new threats of domestic dissi-
dence, the FBI exploited these opportunities to try illegally to disrupt various
leftist groups, and presidents and attorneys general were either uninformed
of such actions or preferred to acquiesce. They made no effort to curtail
Hoover's harassment of King. By the Johnson administration, the President
went so far as to use the FBI to spy on rival forces at his own party's nominat-
ing convention.
Though some bits and pieces of evidence on illegal FBI actions leaked out
over the years, not until Watergate did the press and public express concern
about such matters. Why, we may ask, did these earlier leaks not constitute
important news for the press and public? Why did mainstream publications
not probe further? And, even now, why is there still so much outrage about
the Watergate break-in and similar acts against mainstream political move-
ments, but so little concern about the more severe harassment of marginal
political groups, especially those on the Left?
81. Memorandum from C.D. DeLoach to John Mohr (Aug. 29, 1964), in 6 Intelligence Activities
Hearings 495-502; Memorandum from H.N. Bassett to Nicholas Callahan (Jan. 29, 1975), in 6
Intelligence Activities Hearings 503-09. DeLoach later mentioned the "vital tidbits" supplied.
Memorandun from C.D. Deloach to William Movers (Sept. 10. 1964), in 6 Intelligence Activities
Hearings 510. The FBI even "thwarted the [MFDP's] plans to parade this burned out car" as part
of a protest against Johnson. Memorandum from C.D. DeLoach to John Mohr (Aug. 29, 1964),
in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 498.
82. 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 179-80.
83. Memorandum from FBI, Sullivan Memorandum to John Dean (Senator Barry Goldwater)
(Jan. 31, 1975), in 6 Intelligence Activities Hearings 539; cf. id. at 190. At Johnson's request, the FBI
was also directed to monitor telecasts of the Senate Foreign Relations hearings to determine
whether senators were receiving information from Communists. Memorandum from FBI, Sulli-
van Memorandum to John Dean (Coverage of Television Presentation. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee) (Jan, 31, 1975), in id. at 720.
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III
THE GROWTH AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The political abuses of the national security agencies (especially the FBI) at
home can be explained, in large measure, by the fear of foreign threats and
the accompanying expansion of presidential power: the erosion of congres-
sional authority, the growth of executive war powers and the authority of the
Commander in Chief, the systematic use of deceit and manipulation, the de-
ployment of the CIA for covert warfare, and the commitment without a con-
gressional declaration of United States troops in brief and lengthy undeclared
wars.
In the few decades before the debacle in Vietnam and the uncovering of
Watergate, most scholars of American history and of the contemporary politi-
cal system enthusiastically greeted the expansion of presidential authority in
foreign affairs. Greatness in the White House was measured by the standard
of the active President-one who overrode the opposition of conservative crit-
ics, seized the opportunity of crisis, and expanded the powers of his office.
The world was too complex, the Congress too slow, too disorganized, some-
times too isolationist, and the people too unsure and too uninformed. The
President could not wait upon traditional methods. He had to seize the initia-
tive, take bold action, not allow constitutional niceties to impede him. If he
was wrong, if he went too far to protect the nation, so the argument ran, let
the Congress take action or the courts rebuke him. 84
Bipartisan foreign policy represented, according to this liberal faith, the
politics of responsibility. Its critics, who often challenged the arrogation of
presidential authority, were judged political Neanderthals. Such critics as
Robert A. Taft8 5 and Charles A. Beard, 6 who challenged the emerging
foreign policy and charged presidents with violating the Constitution, failed to
receive a serious hearing from most scholars.
By the liberal standard, and most scholars were liberal, Roosevelt's foreign
policy usually received plaudits. He had led the nation to war against a hated
enemy. That was enough. Constitutional issues seemed of little importance,
for they were most often the questions that so-called isolationists raised.
Whatever his seeming defects in domestic policy, Truman too approached this
standard for presidential greatness. He had greatly expanded the power of
his high office and advanced the interests of the nation. Some liberal critics
quibbled about his having exaggerated to gain the Truman Doctrine in 1947,
84. See, e.g., EISENHOWER AS PRESIDENT (D. Albertson ed. 1963).
85. J. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 232-50, 285-98, 474-96
(1972).
86. Leighton, Beard and Foreign Policy, in CHARLES A. BEARD: AN APPRAISAL 175-84 (H. Beale
ed. 1954).
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but most quickly forgot that issue amid his later bold policies.8 7 Few under-
stood the objections when Taft challenged Truman for going to war in Korea
without a congressional declaration of war. And fewer paid much attention to
the CIA, which Truman created and Eisenhower also exploited for covert
warfare. Eisenhower was, instead, castigated for his Whiggish tendencies. But
Kennedy and the early Johnson, before the mass souring on the Vietnam
War, embodied the liberal standards for the active presidency. Until about
the late sixties, few liberal critics emphasized the dangers of the active presi-
dencv-its enthusiasm for power, its expansion of authority, its overriding or
circumvention of Congress, its use of secrecy and deceit. 88
A. The Roosevelt Administration
These liberal standards have contributed, often in subtle ways, to the very
conditions that made Watergate possible. Few who examine President
Roosevelt's conduct toward Germany in 1941 can deny that he created unfor-
tunate precedents: of deceit and manipulation, fabrication and exploitation of
crises, casual stretching of the Constitution.
In July 1941, Roosevelt made an executive agreement with Iceland to
place marines on the island, and without congressional authorization he dis-
patched troops there. To justify his action, he argued that there was a danger
that Germany might otherwise occupy the island and block "the steady flow of
munitions to Britain-which is a matter of broad policy clearly approved by
Congress."8 "
Senator Taft opposed Roosevelt on constitutional grounds. With a war
raging nearby, the "presence of troops would inevitably lead to war [for the
United States]," Taft argued, so the President was, in effect, bringing the
nation to war without abiding by constitutional requirements. In words that a
later generation would rediscover, the senator declared that the Senate should
not acquiesce "in acts of the President that might nullify for all time the con-
stitutional authority distinctly reserved to Congress to declare war. '90
The presence of United States troops in Iceland, as Taft predicted, did
lead to an undeclared naval war with Germany. Since the troops required con-
VoNS to supplv them, the question arose: Why not allow American ships to
join the convoys? Roosevelt did so. But he carefully concealed the new policy
87. B. BERNSTEIN, POLITICS AND POLICIES OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 3-11 (1970); A.
HAMBY, BEYOND THE NEW DEAL: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM 169-94, 453-78,
505-16, 422-40 (1973).
88. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 177-207 (1973) (note the brief
attention paid to Kennedy and Vietnam).
89. Statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt (July 7, 1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 256 (S. Rosenman ed. 1950).
90. Speech by Robert A. Taft (July 10, 1941), in R. TAFT, A FOREIGN POLICx FOR AMERICANS
31 (1951).
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from Congress and the people. In early September, a United States ship (the
Greer) trailed and reported the location of a German submarine to British
planes, which then dropped depth charges; the U-boat promptly attacked the
American ship.' Roosevelt then seized upon the incident to justify escorting
convoys and to give an order to "shoot on sight."
In his dramatic public address to the nation on September 11, 1941, the
President never mentioned that the Greer had provoked the sub; he described
the American ship as innocently "carrying mail to Iceland," and declared, "I
tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this Ameri-
can destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her." The
Nazi danger to American ships he likened to a rattlesnake, and concluded,
"You do not wait until he has struck you before you destroy him."92
It was a masterful performance, anticipating by thirty-three years Lyndon
Johnson's "Gulf of Tonkin" address. Perhaps Roosevelt did not yet know the
whole truth when he spoke, and he may have believed that the Greer was
innocent. He did not wait for more information. Instead, he seized the oppor-
tunity to reverse policy, to change the neutrality laws, and to move the nation
into an undeclared war with Germany. Had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbor,
this undeclared war in the Atlantic would probably have erupted into World
War II.
There is firm evidence, drawn from recently opened British papers, that
even before the Greer, Roosevelt had been looking for an incident with Ger-
many to lead the United States to war. At the Atlantic Charter meeting with
Churchill in August, the President had promised, according to the Prime
Minister's secret report, that "he would wage war but not declare it and that
he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it,
they could attack American forces. Everything was to be done to force an
incident," Churchill reported. The President "made it clear that he would
look for an 'incident' which would justify him in opening hostilities. ' '93
Examining the public record without access to Churchill's papers, Charles
A. Beard in 1948 condemned Roosevelt for premeditated deception and for
usurpation of powers that he shared with Congress. Beard's angry book con-
cluded that "the American Republic has arrived [at the] theory that the Presi-
dent of the United States possesses limitless authority to misrepresent and
secretly to control foreign policy, foreign affairs, and the war power." The
President "may, to secure legislation in furtherance of his secret designs, mis-
represent to Congress and the people both its purport and the policy he in-
91. W. LANGER & E. GLEASON, THE UNDECLARED WAR, 1940-1941, at 743-44 (1953).
92. Address by Franklin D. Roosevelt (Sept. 11, 1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosEVELI, stupra note 89, at 384, 390.
93. Addendum to War Cabinet Minutes 84 (41), 19 August, 1941, 11:30 A.M., Cabinet Papers,
65/19 (on file in Public Record Office, London). See aLo Bernstein, Roosevelt and the Coming of War
with Germany, - INTELLECT - (1977).
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tends to pursue under its terms." The President may also promise that he will
follow a "policy contrary to war" and yet secretly conduct an undeclared war.
"He may publicly represent to Congress and the people that acts of war have
been committed against the United States, when in reality the said acts were
secretly invited and even initiated by [the United States]. 9 4
In other times, this bludgeoning book might have provoked a probing
dialogue, but in 1948 it simply outraged many American intellectuals, includ-
ing most historians, who could not countenance Beard's continuing criticism
of Roosevelt. Some reviewers acknowledged Roosevelt's mendacity, but they
usually agreed95 with an eminent historian who explained that Roosevelt had
"acted like the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own
good." Roosevelt had revealed a "certain lack of faith in the basic tenets of
democracy"; but the "masses are notoriously shortsighted" and statesmen had
to "deceive them into awareness of their long-run interests." "Deception of
the people may in fact become increasingly necessary," this historian warned,
"unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand."9 6
This analysis was close to the prevailing view among American historians,
political scientists, and diplomats by the late forties. Much of the established
scholarship expressed a fear of the masses and a faith in elites. For George
Kennan,97 Walter Lippmann, 98 and Hans Morgenthau, 99 three men whose
thought shaped the emerging orthodoxy, the message was often blunt and
compelling: the need for an activist Executive defining the national interest,
subduing or avoiding the passions of the electorate and the legalism-moralism
of earlier policy, and overriding the localism and parochialism of Congress. The
people were usually wrong and the experts were usually right. "The unhappy
truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the
critical junctures," Lippmann declared 10
What could be done if Congress and popular opinion continued to "de-
vitalize, to enfeeble, and to eviscerate the executive powers?""' The answers,
emerging as a supple and powerful body of thought, provided the rationale
for what a later generation would come to fear as an "imperial presidency":
94. C. BEARD, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF THE WAR, 1941: A STUDY IN
APPEARANCES AND REALITIES, 582-83, 598 (1948).
95. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., MR. BEARD ON F.D.R.'s PRE-WAR POLICY, reviewed, N.Y. Times Book
Review, Apr. 11, 1948, at 4, col. 3; id. at 29, col. 2; Craig, Our Foreign Policy in 1941, 37 YALE
REv. 762 (1948).
96. T. BAILEY, THE MAN IN THE STREET: THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON
FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1948).
97. G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950, at 56-73, 89-101 (1951).
98. See generally W. LIPPMANN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955).
99. Morgenthau, The Decline and Fall of American Foreign Policy, 135 NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10,
1956, at 11.
100. W. LIPPMANN, snpra note 98, at 23-24.
101. Id. at 49.
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the contrivance of crises, the emphasis on expertise, the disregard of Con-
stitutional niceties, the manipulation of the electorate, and the erosion of con-
gressional power.
B. The Truman Administration
This dominant analysis represented, in effect, implicit approval of much
of the Truman administration's policy. Let me discuss three important
examples-the Truman Doctrine (1947), intervention in Korea (1950), and
the growth of the CIA (1947-52)-to illustrate and to explain the course of
these developments.
It is now generally agreed that Truman exaggerated the crisis in Greece in
1947 to gain congressional approval for aid to Greece and Turkey. In so
doing, he was following the advice of Senator Arthur Vandlenburg, Republi-
can leader of bipartisanship, who counseled, "Scare hell out of the coun-
try."' 2 To strengthen the argument for aid, Truman protrayed the issue in
Greece as a battle between the forces of freedom and totalitarianism. 103 Such
a description was, he knew, quite false. His problem was a familiar one faced
by most Presidents and analyzed presciently by Lippmann: how to lead the
nation, to get Congress to approve needed programs. Truman's solution was
to let advocacy become deceit.
Truman's intervention in the Korean War, more than any other action in
his administration, reduced the power of Congress and threatened to establish
a new presidential power: the unilateral authority to commit substantial
American forces in a foreign war, in the absence of an attack on America for
a sustained period. When Taft argued that Truman did not have this legal
authority and that he was usurping congressional powers,1" 4 Dean Ache-
son, the Secretary of State and a brilliant attorney, cavalierly dismissed the
challenge as typical senatorial quibbling. Acheson even advised Truman not to
accept a proffered congressional resolution, and instead to rely upon his con-
stitutional powers as President and Commander in Chief. The Secretary of
State and the President both feared establishing a "precedent in derogation of
presidential power to send our forces into battle." 
15
102. E. GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE: AMERICA. 1945-1955. at 29 (1956); ci D. ACHESON.
PRESENI AT THE CREATION: "IN' YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTIENT 219 (1969).
103. Address by Harry S. Truman (March 12, 1947). in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS:
HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1947, at 176-80 (W. Reid ed. 1963). Consider, for example, this sentence:
"There is no other countr to which democratic Greece can turn." 1d. at 177. See also Bernstein,
Truaon, the Eightieth Congress, and the Traoformatioii of Political Culture, 2 CAPLITOL STUDIES 65.
at 70-75 (1973).
104. 96 CONG. REC. 9320-23 (1950). For similar objections, see Washington Post, June 28,
1950, at 9, col. 3. See also Bernstein, The Week We Went to War: American Intervention in the Korean
Civil War: Part 1, 54 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 6, 6-9. 33-35; Part 1 in id. 8, 8-11, 33-34.
105. D. ACHESON, supra note 102. at '10. 414-15. See also MenoLrandtIm (June 30. 1950) (on
file with the ElseNs Papers. Trunan Library).
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The Truman administration, which created the CIA and used it for covert
warfare, left a strong institutional legacy to future administrations. In April
1950, a distinguished panel of government officials approved an important
document (NSC-68), which justified virtually any action in the Cold War:" 6
The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert,
or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purpose of frustrating the
Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to af-
firm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures....
This document, while never technically official policy, expressed the think-
ing of top leaders on the obligation of the United States government to do
whatever was necessary to frustrate the Kremlin. This analysis easily carried
over into domestic policy, and NSC-68 even called for "development of inter-
nal security programs."'' 7 The policy paper also expressed succinctly the ra-
tionale for covert warfare.
The original legislation that established the CIA in 1947 did not include
any explicit provision for covert warfare. When congressional committee
members asked about operational activities at the hearings on the legislation,
government spokesmen provided "reassuring answers." 1 8 Only later would it
appear that one loosely-worded provision (the agency could "perform such
other functions as the National Security Council may . ..direct")"1 9 opened
the way for what Congress had not intended.I"
By 1948, the National Security Council had created within the CIA an
organization for secret political activities (Office of Special Operations),1 1'
which conducted covert operations in Italy."1 2 In 1949, when the earlier legis-
lation was amended, the Director described the agency's functions simply as
the "coordination and production of foreign intelligence pertaining to na-
106. National Security Council Document No. 68, at 12 (on file in PSF).
107. Id. at 57.
108. Ransom, Congress and Intelligence Agencies, in CONGRESS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 155-57
(H. Mansfield ed. 1975); COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 50-55 (1975).
109. Section 102(d)(5), National Security Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 498 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(5) (1970)).
110. Hearings on the Nomination of William E. Colby Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Serices, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973). Apparently the original legislation may have been designed to
include (and to conceal the intent of) covert operations. 7 Intelligence Activities Hearings 50-51; cj.
Interview with Walter Phorzeimer (Jan. 30, 1975), in D. Klaus, Draft History of the CIA (Dec.
1975) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
11. See National Security Council Document 4, Modern Military Records (on file in National
Archives); References to NSC 4A, 10, & 10/2, in D. Klaus, sopra note 110, at 13-16.
112. 7 Intelligence Activities Hearings 66. Clark Clifford, Truman's former counsel and adviser,
testified that in 1948, "[t]he United States saw fit to conduct a covert operation in Italy. Had they
done so openly, it not only would have been counter-productive, but I think it would have as-
sured a Communist victory." Id. In 1963, Truman denied that the CIA had conducted covert
operations in his administration. Washington Post, Dec. 22, 1963, at 11, col. 3, § A. His memory
was faulty or he was lying.
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tional security." The manager of the bill in the House of Representatives as-
sured inquiring congressmen that the CIA had no internal security functions
and operated only in the area of foreign intelligence. Since the hearings in
committee were secret, we cannot be sure whether this contradicted what had
been said in the committee.' 13
The 1949 legislation greatly expanded the Director's powers, allowed him
broad discretion in the spending of funds (for "objects of a confidential, ex-
traordinary, or emergency nature") on personal voucher, and practically re-
moved the agency from any congressional oversight. The CIA had become a
secret arm of the executive, with a secret budget, known to only a few con-
gressmen and tucked away in appropriations for other agencies. Most con-
gressmen were voting on a budget they could not see for activities they could
not know. That was the logical extension in one section of the government of
the "national security" rationale. 14
C. The Eisenhower Administration
Under Eisenhower, the significant expansion of executive power did not
occur in areas of public scrutiny, involving the powers of the President as
Commander in Chief, but in the use of the CIA for covert activities-to over-
throw governments in Iran (1953), Guatamela (1954), and Laos (1959); to
assassinate national leaders, including Patrice Lumumba; and to try to kill
Fidel Castro."1 5 Eisenhower himself probably authorized these attempted
assassinations." 6 The CIA was not very independent of the President and it
undoubtedly had his trust, for its director was Allen W. Dulles, the brother of
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Congress, sharing prevailing Cold
War assumptions, never pursued the occasional charges that the CIA was
conducting covert warfare. Probably most congressmen preferred not to know
the details, underestimated the magnitude of agency actions, and acceded to
the course of events. The result was that men of good will, while accepting
the need for covert activities, could deny what they suspected and proclaim
that the United States, unlike foreign "isms," was different: moral and in-
nocent.' 
17
Unlike Truman, Eisenhower was often inclined to Whiggish principles as
113. Ransom, supra note 108, at 157. In executive session, the House committee learned that
the 1949 bill envisaged covert activities beyond intelligence gathering, but no member of the
committee revealed this fact in the floor debate. I SENATE SELECT COMM. 10 STUDY GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1976).
114. Id. at 158-66.
115. Wise, Covert Actiopu Abroad, in THE CIA FILE 19-22 (R. Borosage & D. Marks eds. 1976).
116. SENATE SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No.
415, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 1-70, 108-14 (1975).
117. For supporting evidence without my conclusions, see Ransom, supra note 108, at 159-66.
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President. He was usually more scrupulous constitutionally and more astute
politically, for he secured congressional approval for most major interventions
with American forces. In 1955, for example, he gained a congressional resolu-
tion that "authorized [the President] to employ the Armed Forces of the
United States as he deems necessary" in defense of Formosa, the Pescadores,
and related islands. It was a blank check granted in good faith and with very
few questions. 1 8 Two years later, in advance of armed intervention, he asked
for a similar grant of power to use American troops in the Middle East
"against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international
Communism." 1 9 This time, partly under the prodding Senator J. William
Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Congress
stopped short of the request and issued a general declaration of policy. If a
real emergency developed, Fulbright reasoned, let the President act and then
justify his action. It was dangerous, Fulbright stressed, for Congress to abdi-
cate its warmaking power in advance. 2 " In 1958, when Eisenhower did
briefly commit about fourteen thousand troops in Jordan, he seemed to re-
turn to Acheson's position that the President had this power. Congress did
not challenge him.' 2 '
D. The Kennedy Administration
President John F. Kennedy, not burdened by Whiggish principles, was
firmly committed to expansion of the nation's influence abroad and to the full
use, even the enlargement, of presidential power. He continued to use the
CIA to help overthrow governments, a policy dramatized by the debacle at
the Bay of Pigs. That invasion, planned under Eisenhower and approved by
Kennedy, was the first dramatic revelation to the American public of the
agency's role ("dirty tricks") in the execution of foreign policy. Learning a
limited lesson from the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy tried to bring the CIA more
closely under his control and to improve its efficiency for similar operations.
The revamped agency continued the vendetta against Castro 22 and even plot-
ted his assassination, probably with the approval of the President.'23 The CIA,
118. 1 D. EISENHOWER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 608 (1963). See also id. at 552-60 for a
discussion of events. Senator Wayne Morse charged presciently that the resolution gave the Pres-
ident "a predatory authorization" to wage war. Id. at 468. Lippmann concluded that the President
already had the constitutional authority to commit troops without congressional sanction.
Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1955, at 13, col. 1.
119. 2 D. EISENHOWER, supra note 118, at 269-73.
120. 103 CONG. REC. 1855-59 (1957).
121. 2 D. EISENHOWER, supra note 118, at 273-75. In 1965, Eisenhower indicated that he had
cited the Eisenhower Doctrine as justification when he discussed matters with Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan in 1958. Id. at 273. See also Bernstein, Foreign Policy in the Eisenhower Ad-
mninistration, 50 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 17, 17-20, 29-30, 38 (1973).
122. Branch & Crile, The Kennedy Vendetta, 250 HARPER'S 49 (Aug. 1975).
123. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, supra note 116, at 116-65,
197-215.
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with presidential approval, also operated clandestinely in Laos to stave off
communism and to shore up pro-American forces.' 24
Who was fooled by the administration's denials of these actions? Not Cas-
tro and his fellow Cubans, nor the Laotians, who were victims of a substantial
secret United States war. The Russian and Chinese governments, as well as
the governments of allies, knew about these ventures. It was the American
people, much of the trusting press, and many congressmen who were de-
ceived. Secrecy had become an important strategem for concealing the United
States Government's illicit activities from its own citizens.
No study of the growth and abuse of presidential power would be com-
plete without some attention to the Vietnam war, partly because it, almost as
much as Watergate, has compelled a reassessment of the presidency. It was
Kennedy, building on precedents established by his immediate predecessors,
who sent soldiers (euphemistically designated "advisers") to fight in Vietnam.
There was no declaration of war, no explicit congressional authorization, not
even an executive admission that the "advisers" often served as combat sol-
diers. 2 The thin veil of fiction was sufficient for a few years to deceive the
American people and most of Congress.
E. The Johnson Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson greatly escalated the war. Exploiting an alleged North
Vietnamese attack on United States ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4,
1964, he castigated the "unprovoked aggression" and asked Congress for a
resolution that it "approves and supports the determination of the President,
as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures . . .to prevent further
aggression [in Southeast Asia]."' 26 Unlike his predecessors, Johnson was ask-
ing for an endorsement after he had already committed substantial numbers
of troops, but he did not believe that he needed congressional approval to
escalate the conflict. Though Under-Secretary of State Katzenbach claimed
that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was the "functional equivalent" of a decla-
ration of war, 1 27 Johnson apparently wanted it primarily for political protec-
tion, not constitutional sanction. 2 '
In securing the resolution, the Johnson administration had fabricated a
124. Branfan, The President's Secret Armv: A Case Study-The CIA in Laos, 1962-1972, in THE
CIA FILE, supra note 115, at 46-47.
125. N. SHEEHAN, et al., THE PENTAGON PAPERS, at 104-14 (1971).
126. Hearings on S.J. Res. 189 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). For a discussion of the North Vietnamese at-
tacks of August 2, which the United States probably provoked, see id., at 258-61 and I.F. STONE,
POLEMICS AND PROPHECIES 1967-1970, at 307-37 (1970).
127. Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
82 (1967).
128. L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENCY, 1963-1969, at
115-81 (1971).
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crisis to justify, and gain sanction for, programs it had already planned. The
administration claimed that North Vietnamese ships on August 4 had fired
torpedoes at United States ships which had then returned the fire. 129 Later,
partly under pressure from suspicious congressmen, facts trickled out that
undermined this distorted version of events. Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara admitted a few years later that the United States ships had opened
fire first-"When it was evident from [enemy craft] maneuvers that they
[enemy craft] were pressing for attack positions." Even then he did not ac-
knowledge an equally troubling fact: The United States task force commander
had cabled Washington a few hours after the alleged attack that the reports
of enemy torpedoes might be dubious, for there was "freak weather," "an
overeager sonarman," and "no actual visual sighting."1 3 0
Probably we will never know precisely what happened in the Gulf of Ton-
kin. Yet we do know that the administration, on the basis of evidence it pos-
sessed, did intentionally deceive the Congress and the people. Johnson,
McNamara, and their associates probably believed that their ultimate goals
were justified, even noble. Like Roosevelt, as one historian had explained in
1948, they had to "deceive [the people] into an awareness of their own long-
run interests."
1 3 1
F. Conclusions
The historical record shows that during the nearly three decades before
Nixon, various administrations have deceived and manipulated the Congress
and the public on major issues of foreign policy. In the postwar years, they
have also used covert warfare and other "dirty tricks" against various nations.
In view of these continuing strategies, why should Americans be so surprised
by the deceit and dishonesty of Richard Nixon? He did not invent the tactics.
He inherited them, and like his predecessors, he did not worry about violat-
ing the law. Nor, like them, did he expect to get caught.
Why, we may ask, are citizens, the press, and the Congress so much more
disturbed about Nixon's policy (with Watergate) than with his own and his
predecessors' policies in foreign affairs? Watergate was a subversion and cor-
ruption of the political process, but it did not raise issues of life and death, of
war and peace. Presidential policy in foreign affairs has raised precisely these
issues, and at critical junctures it has been assisted by secrecy and deceit.
129. Hearbigs on S.J. Res. 189, supra note 126, at 4-10, 21-22.
130. Hem ing on The Gulf of I"o kitn. the 1964 Incidents Before the Senate Comm. oni Foreign
Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, 54 (1970).
131. T. BAILEY, Supral note 96, at 13.
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IV
HAS THE SYSTEM BEEN TRANSFORMED?
In important ways, Watergate has dramatized for scholars and laymen the
problems that the painful war in Vietnam first uncovered. It is valuable that
we again consider questions of executive authority, that we reconsider the
critiques by Taft and Beard, that we lament the excesses that liberal standards
for the presidency endorsed, that we recognized the illegal actions of the FBI,
CIA, and other agencies, and that we acknowledge that they sometimes
slipped beyond even executive control.
We should not be sanguine that our agonizing reassessments, the unravel-
ling of Watergate, or subsequent congressional investigations will greatly
change matters. Consider, for example, the behavior of President Gerald
Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the Mayaguez incident: ex-
ploiting a minor (and predictable) seizure by expanding it into a crisis, flexing
our military muscles, and bombing Cambodia after the American sailors were
freed. 132 Or, consider that not one indictment had emerged by Spring 1976
from the revelations by the Church Committee; nor, so far as we know, had
anyone in the CIA or FBI even been dismissed. Or, consider that the Pen-
tagon kept a double set of books on bombings in North Vietnam, yet the
Congress approved the promotion of one of the Air Force generals who had
falsified the reports. l33
Perhaps the most eloquent evidence of the difficulty in imposing standards
of personal responsibility, or requiring that national leaders adhere to the law,
was the support that many leaders of the national security system bestowed on
embattled Richard Helms in the winter of 1974-1975. At that time, evidence
had emerged that he had participated in the coverup of Watergate, that he
might have perjured himself before Congress, and that he had allowed illegal
mail openings and domestic snooping. Rallying around him, former and
present government officials attended a party designed, as the Washington Post
put it, to cheer up "an old friend, a comrade wounded by recent [dis-
closures].' 3 4
Senator Stuart Symington applauded him for doing a "splendid job" as
Director of CIA. Robert McNamara, formerly Secretary of Defense and then
head of the World Bank, warmly toasted Helms. According to the Post,
"McNamara wanted all in the room to know: whatever Dick Helms did,
132. Stone, Conned in Cambodia, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 12, 1975, at 16.
133. San Francisco Chronicle. June 11, 1975, at 8, cots. 1-2.
134. Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1975. at 1, col. 1; id. at 20, col. 1. The Rockefeller Commission
concluded that Helms knew that the CIA domestic programs were illegal and that they were
being conducted even though he denied this under oath. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note
108. at 132-33.
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whether it was over the line [legal] or not, the former secretary supported
him fully." "Helms is an honorable man," Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
declared, while rebuking William Colby, Helms' successor, who had disclosed
the CIA's domestic spying. 13 5 The guiding assumption of McNamara and the
others was that Helms was being pilloried for doing what was necessary, for
what the Congress and much of the nation had tacitly approved; that a
squeamish Congress and public were now unfairly revising the standards of
conduct for public officials by demanding that they neither commit nor con-
ceal crimes. For nearly forty years, as McNamara and Kissinger knew, that
had not been the standard: Crimes on behalf of "national security" had been
necessary and moral.
135. Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id. at 20, col. I.
